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Bosnia and Kosovo are the only two members of the EU enlargement 
zone that have never tried to apply for EU membership, given that both 
are too far from complying with the required minimum standards. 
But besides lacking basic capacities, these two potential candidates 
share another common feature: both are limited, to different degrees, 
in their national sovereignty. This lack of sovereignty not only limits 
the capacity of the potential candidates to negotiate or to enter into 
agreements with the EU; it also undermines their readiness to undertake 
serious reforms. The EU tries to dodge the political blockades that are 
the root cause of the problem by focusing on the technical issues; 
this might provide a temporary relief but cannot substitute a realistic 
accession perspective, which is currently absent. However, without this 
perspective, the EU’s ‘normative power’ in these countries will continue 
to erode – which bears the risk that both Kosovo and Bosnia will, in the 
end, try to solve existing problems through unilateral measures, such 
as partition. Given its lack of ability to provide alternatives, the EU has 
to realistically consider such outcomes and think about the possible 
consequences.
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Introduction
At  a  time  when  the  EU  is  fully  absorbed  with  resolving 
its  internal  problems  and  saving  the  Euro,  it  seems  that 
enlargement has slid down to the bottom of the EU’s list of 
priorities.  Although  a  number  of  Member  States  are  quite 
open in expressing their aversion to further EU enlargement 
beyond  Croatia  and  Iceland,  the  EU  regularly  and  ritually 
confirms the European perspective of the Western Balkans and 
Turkey. In the meantime, the membership negotiations with 
two candidate countries, Turkey and FYROM, are blocked due 
to their bilateral disputes with Cyprus and Greece respectively. 
In March 2012 Serbia scored a diplomatic victory by attaining 
the  status  of  candidate  country;  but  its  actual  accession 
perspective is distant, given the unresolved Kosovo question. 
Whereas Montenegro might have some hopes for a successful 
EU integration due to its small size and the absence of ethnic 
tensions, the membership perspectives for Albania, Kosovo 
and Bosnia seem, at present, more distant than ever.
This article will look in detail at the particular 
situation of the only two potential candidates 
that have so far – for particular reasons – never 
applied for membership: Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Beyond  their  smouldering  ethnic  conflicts 
and their lack of institutional capacity to face 
the  challenges  of  membership,  these  two 
countries  share  another  distinctive  feature: 
they do not enjoy – to different degrees – 
full  sovereignty.  But  would  less-than-fully-
sovereign  countries  technically  be  able  to 
become  members  of  the  EU?  What  is  the 
nature  of  these  limitations  to  sovereignty? 
What are the conditions of these countries 
to become fully sovereign, and would this be a pre-condition 
for  further  progress  towards  EU  integration?  What  might 
be  the  unintended  consequences  of  full  sovereignty?   
To which extent is the accession perspective of these potential 
candidates determined by political developments in Belgrade, 
Brussels or in other European capitals, rather than in these 
countries themselves?
Kosovo and Bosnia: same dilemma, in reverse
At  first  glance,  both  Kosovo  and  Bosnia  appear  to  bear  a 
degree of similarity: limited sovereignty, weak institutions and 
an unwillingness of a national minority (in both cases Serbian) 
to integrate into a common state. Something shared by both 
countries is that their very own territorial integrity is granted 
by external factors: in each of the two cases it was the verdict 
of the international community after a devastating war, with 
the  resulting  arrangements  overseen  by  an  international 
supervisory body with executive powers (The Office of the 
High representative/OHR in Bosnia; The International Civilian 
Office/ICO and the EU Rule of Law Mission/EULEX in Kosovo).
 
However, the similarities end here. The Bosnian state owes its 
existence to a top-down initiative of the US and the international 
community from the 1995 Dayton conference; it was endorsed 
internationally  but  only  grudgingly  accepted  by  most  of  its 
citizens, given the lack of a common identity among its people. 
On the other hand, the Republic of Kosovo, self-proclaimed in 
2008 on the territory of the former UN protectorate against the 
resistance of the international community, enjoys the support of 
the overwhelming majority of its citizens. Unlike Bosnia, Kosovo 
has the ownership of the vast majority of its people. 
Limited sovereignty: self-inflicted vs. imposed from above?
Limitations  of  sovereignty  can  take  three  different  forms: 
a.  through  the  presence  of  international  caretakers  with 
executive powers; b. through the inability to exercise sovereign 
powers; and c. through non-recognition on the international 
stage. The first scenario applies to both Bosnia and Kosovo; the 
second applies to Bosnia; and the third to Kosovo.
a.   Limited sovereignty through the presence of international  
  caretakers
  The international arrangements that have prompted the   
  emergence of both Bosnia and Kosovo as distinct entities   
  on the international map, following a devastating conflict,   
  had  put  in  place  a  number  of  safeguards  to  guarantee   
  the survival of the new entity: the 1995 Dayton agreement   
  that  created  Bosnia  had  foreseen  an  Office  of  the  High   
  Representative  (OHR),  mandated  by  the  international   
  community.  The  High  Representative  would  guarantee,   
  through his executive powers (‘Bonn powers’), the respect   
  of the Dayton agreement. The Constitution of Bosnia and   
  Herzegovina,  technically  an  annexe  to  the  Dayton   
  agreement,  provides  for  a  share  of  power  between  the   
  different ethnically-based entities of the common state.
  Kosovo,  as  a  former  Serbian  province,  became  a  UN   
  protectorate  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Serbian  troops   
  following  UN  Security  Council  Resolution  1244  that,  in   
  1999, put an end to the Kosovo conflict. Gradually, the UN   
  administration (UNMIK) transferred some of its powers to   
  the  newly  created  local  institutions  of  self-government.   
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  In  the  wake  of  Kosovo’s  unilateral  declaration  of   
  independence in 2008, the residual powers of UNMIK (in   
  particular police, justice and customs) were transferred to   
  an EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX). Although EULEX was   
  set  up  prior  to  the  declaration  of  independence,  it  not   
  only survived the creation of the new state – its executive   
  role  was  even  enshrined  into  the  Kosovo  constitution1. 
  Currently,  around  1400  EU  police,  customs  officials,   
  judges  and  prosecutors  with  an  executive  mandate  not   
  only complement the work of their local colleagues, but   
  have the power to overrule their local hosts. In addition, an   
  International Civilian Office Exercises functions similar to   
  those of the OHR in Bosnia. 
b.  Self-inflicted limitation of sovereignty 
  Although  Bosnia’s  sovereignty  is  still  technically  limited   
  through the installation of the OHR in 1995 as overseer   
  with  executive  powers  the  OHR  has  gradually  over  the   
  last few years taken a more hands-off approach, making the   
  limitations  to  Bosnia’s  sovereignty  at  present  rather   
  symbolic.  And  even  this  might  not  last  for  long:  the   
  phasing-out  of  the  OHR  has  been  foreseen  since  2008   
  and  might  eventually  happen  in  the  near  future.  But   
  already now, if Bosnia wanted, it could largely function as a 
  sovereign  state.  Bosnia’s  sovereignty  is  universally   
  recognised and it has a seat at the UN. Its present limitations 
  to the full exercise of sovereignty are largely self-inflicted.   
  Whereas joint institutions exist, they are extremely weak   
  and  partly  dysfunctional2,  given  that  ethnic  Bosnians, 
  Croats and Serbs are essentially concerned about retaining   
  powers for their own entities. The almost complete lack   
  of a common identity among the different communities   
  of  Bosnia  and  the  resulting  limitations  for  transferring   
  further competences to the central authorities have made   
  it difficult for the Bosnian entities to agree on the choice   
  of legitimate representatives at the state level. In Bosnia,   
  state sovereignty is largely lying fallow, as the constituent   
  parts of the state cannot agree on how to make use of them.
c.  Limitation of sovereignty imposed from above
  After its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008,   
  the  Republic  of  Kosovo  has  been  recognised  by  90  UN   
  members  and  by  22  out  of  the  27  EU  Member  states3. 
  The five states that have not recognised Kosovo have not   
  done  so  for  reasons  unrelated  to  Kosovo  itself:  Spain,   
  Greece,  Cyprus,  Romania  and  Slovakia  fear  that  the   
  recognition  of  Kosovo  could  send  the  wrong  signals  to   
  their own national minorities. Given the lack of unanimity   
  among the EU Member States, the EU has never recognised   
  Kosovo as a state; although, since 2005, Kosovo has the   
  status of a potential4 candidate for EU accession5.
  But  this  lack  of  international  recognition  does  not  stop   
  Kosovo from internally assuming its state-like role. Within   
  its  borders,  Kosovo’s  statehood  is  hardly  contested. The   
  refusal  of  the  three  Serbian-populated  municipalities  of   
  Northern Kosovo to integrate into the state is of high political, 
  but of little practical impact6: These three municipalities 
  account for less than 3% of the Kosovo population, and the   
  writ of Pristina has never reached out to these municipalities,   
  which  still  largely  operate  as  de  facto  parts  of  Serbia7. 
  The Kosovo government is building state institutions that   
  are  admittedly  still  weak,  but  steadily  albeit  slowly   
  increasing their capacity8– and this with major assistance 
  from the EU9. 
Limited sovereignty as an obstacle to accession
Whatever  its  nature,  self-inflicted  or  imposed 
from above, in both Bosnia and Kosovo, limited 
sovereignty stands in the way of EU integration. 
This  happens  in  three  ways:  a.  through  the 
lack  of  motivation  and  ownership  such  limited 
sovereignty  entails  (for  both  countries);  b.  through  the 
impossibility to agree on a coordination structure/ a common 
interlocutor for the dialogue/negotiations with the EU (Bosnia); 
and c. through the impossibility to sign legal agreements as a 
result of the non-recognition (Kosovo) 
a.  Lack of sovereignty = lack of ownership 
  Where  a  potential  candidate  is  not  fully  competent  in   
  dealing with all the aspects relevant to EU enlargement   
  (such  as  the  Rule  of  Law),  it  becomes  very  difficult  to   
  effectively  measure  the  progress  of  the  institutions   
  towards  meeting  the  accession  criteria.  The  concept  of   
  international  overseeing  implies  the  power  to  overrule   
  locally-taken decisions. Responsibilities that are normally   
  dealt with by local institutions are given to an international   
  body (OHR Bosnia; ICO/EULEX  Kosovo). This undermines   
  the  principle  of  local  ‘ownership’.    Within  the  EU   
  enlargement  methodology,  the  principle  of  ‘ownership’   
  (or  the  political  will  on  the  side  of  the  candidate  to   
  engage in reforms, as opposed to reforms imposed from   
  outside) is a central mantra for the EU when it comes to   
  preparing the (potential) countries for accession. ‘Ownership’   
  is  not  compatible  with  decisions  imposed  from  outside:   
  why,  for  example,  should  the  authorities  from  Republika   
  Srpska  refrain  from  making  irresponsible  and  populist   
  statements (like calling for a referendum on secession) if   
  they  can  reasonably  assume  that  these  decisions   
  will  be  vetoed  by  the  international  caretaker   
  anyway?  Why  should  the  Kosovo  justice  institutions   
  take risks by indicting a highly influential local politician   
  for corruption, if this ‘hot potato’ can be handled by the EU   
  Rule of Law mission?
b.  Lack of coordinating powers and of a common interlocutor 
  for the EU 
  In the Bosnian case, the failure of the constituent entities   
  of state to agree on a common political vision is the biggest   
  obstacle to making progress towards accession. Given the   
  unwillingness  to  agree  on  the  repartition  of  powers10 
  and on common interlocutors to talk with the European   
  Commission, how could Bosnia become a credible partner   
  to effectively negotiate its way through the 120 000 pages   
  of acquis, let alone to meet the political criteria? Therefore, 
  as  long  as  the  central  government  does  not  even  have   
  the  power  to  effectively  coordinate  the  action  of  the   
  different entities and to ensure that they speak with one   
  voice to Brussels, Bosnia’s European perspective will remain   
  distant11.    
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c.  Lack of legal personality due to non-recognition 
  Given the objection of five Member States to recognise   
  Kosovo as a state – and thus as a subject of international   
  law with a legal personality and treaty-making powers –   
  the EU cannot conclude any legal agreements with Kosovo12. 
  It is therefore, among others, unable to sign a Stabilisation 
  and Association Agreement (SAA) with the young state –   
  a fundamental hurdle in Kosovo’s way towards accession.   
  Bosnia signed its SAA back in 2008, but is not politically   
  able to fill it with substance; Kosovo, on the other hand,   
  might arguably have sufficient substance13 but is not able 
  to get the legal framework, due to external factors beyond   
  its control. 
The EU’s approach: technical solutions to political problems
The EU is very much aware of these dilemmas and is trying to 
work around these political blockages by tackling them from a 
technical angle: in Bosnia, the EU accepts that the entities are 
free to legislate on areas that are relevant to EU integration at 
their level, as long as the resulting legislation is not in conflict 
with the acquis. This approach, which is in line with the BiH 
constitution – which regulates the internal distribution of 
powers – has the merit of keeping the dialogue on track at a 
technical level, even if progress is made at a snail’s pace14. 
The neo-functionalist approach of using a technical method in 
order to achieve political effects was also used in Serbia/Kosovo: 
the EU was able to use its normative power15 to coax Serbia 
into signing a number of technical agreements with Kosovo, 
given that for Serbia the conferral of the (rather symbolic16 17) 
candidate status was of utmost political importance. These 
technical  agreements  concluded  between  Belgrade  and 
Pristina  since  March  2011  have  the  potential  to  overcome 
some of the fallout from Kosovo’s diplomatic isolation: both 
sides have agreed on modalities for policing their common 
borders  (or  administrative 
boundaries, as the Serbian side 
insists),  on  collecting  customs 
fees  and  on  the  recognition 
of  travel  documents,  number 
plates  and  diplomas.  Finally, 
in  February  2012,  and  under 
significant  pressure  from  the 
EU, Serbia and Kosovo reached 
an  agreement  about  the 
representation  of  Kosovo  at 
regional  organisations18,  with 
the  potential  of  overcoming 
Kosovo’s isolation.
Whilst they have surely boosted Serbia’s efforts towards EU 
integration, have these technical arrangements also opened 
the way towards Kosovo’s eventual EU accession? It is true 
that,  as  an  incentive  for  Kosovo  to  endorse  the  February 
2012 agreement19, the five non-recognising Member States 
agreed to allow the Commission to draft a feasibility study 
on the conclusion of an SAA20. But even in the case that the 
Commission recommends entering into negotiations on such 
an agreement 21, it is unlikely that the SAA with Kosovo will be 
signed, given the fundamental opposition of at least some 
of  the  five  objecting  Member  States  against  recognition22. 
Similarly, in Bosnia, any eventual progress on the technical 
level risks being invalidated by the inability of the entities to 
find a common interlocutor for the accession negotiations at 
state level. 
The end of an illusion?
Is  the  EU  barking  up  the  wrong  tree  by 
focusing on the technical issues and ignoring 
the political realities? So far, the EU is sticking 
to the position that over time the different 
ethnic  groups  in  Kosovo  and  in  Bosnia 
will  overcome  their  mutual  distrust  and 
animosities and that they will work together 
on building a multiethnic society based on 
the principles of democracy and rule of law23. There is a broad 
consensus within the EU that the international overseeing of 
both Bosnia and Kosovo should be limited, thus advocating 
the full sovereignty of Bosnia and – implicitly – of Kosovo24. 
However, for the EU, the idea that the people of Bosnia and 
Kosovo might decide otherwise and conclude that keeping 
the common state in its present form is not a viable option, 
is – at least officially – not to be considered. 
But  are  there  other  options 
for  Bosnia  and  Kosovo  than 
following  the  path  traced  for 
them  by  the  EU,  once  they 
become  masters  of  their  own 
destiny? Although there might 
be a degree of similarity in both 
cases, the potential alternative 
options  are  different  for  both 
countries;  however,  there  are 
more  potential  choices  for 
Kosovo than for Bosnia.
For  Kosovo,  Serbia’s  desire  to 
enter the EU could create a windfall opportunity: Serbia knows 
that it has few chances to join the EU unless the fundamental 
question  of  Kosovo’s  status  is  resolved  in  a  sustainable 
manner25. This would amount to – given the absence of other 
feasible options – a full recognition of Kosovo by Belgrade. 
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However, such a scenario would most likely involve a land 
swap between Serbia and Kosovo. In spite of official denials, 
both  sides  have  actually  been  considering  this  option  and 
have  warmed  to  the  idea  ever  since26.  Pristina  knows  that 
it is unlikely to ever extend its writ over the northern part, 
which  is  increasingly  being  felt  like  a  millstone  around 
its  neck27.  And  for  Serbia,  gaining  the  almost  exclusively 
Serbian northern part in exchange for the unruly, Albanian-
populated Preshevo valley seems a decent price to pay for a 
realistic membership perspective. International reservations 
about a precedence this would set for other regions in the 
Balkans  are  not  necessarily  justified:  as  this  would  be  a 
mutually  agreed  solution  between  two  (then)  sovereign 
states, it could not be compared with other Balkan regions 
such as FYROM or Bosnia.
The partition/land swap scenario is so far abhorred by the 
EU, as it would highlight the failure of its previous approach 
towards the Western Balkans. However, it is an option which – 
like it or not – will definitively be on the table. However, what 
might be feasible for Kosovo is not at all an option for Bosnia. 
For Pristina, the loss of the Serbian North would hardly make 
any difference in practice, given that its writ never extended 
to the North28. Bosnia, on the other hand, is unlikely to survive 
without the Republika Srpska 29, especially as there would be 
nothing that Bosnia could get in exchange. From a Serbian 
point of view, such a breakaway might seem, at first glance, 
as an attractive alternative to a dysfunctional state: Republika 
Srpska, with its rather well functioning institutions, could have 
the technical capacities to engage as a partner into a dialogue 
with the EU. But this would ignore the consequences for the 
Bosnian-Croat federation, where competences are dispersed 
in an unsustainable way among a multitude of local entities 
that are not able to survive on their own. It is highly likely that 
Bosnians would react with armed force in an effort to prevent 
an RS breakaway 30, risking a new wave of violence and chaos 
in the region. 
Conclusions
Brussels’ approach of focusing on the technical dialogue while 
blending out the political dimension is unlikely to bring Kosovo 
and Bosnia closer to the EU. Above all, full external and internal 
sovereignty is a necessary precondition to seriously engaging 
in the accession process; but whether a fully sovereign Bosnia 
or Kosovo will follow the roadmap traced by the EU which 
leads through reconciliation and the building of a multi-ethnic 
society based on the rule of law, cannot be taken for granted. 
At least for Kosovo, there are alternative ways of solving one 
of the fundamental obstacles – the question of the Serbian 
minority in the north – through a land swap. This option is, 
on the other hand, not open to Bosnia. Furthermore, the land 
swap option does not mean that all obstacles in Kosovo’s way 
towards accession will be removed: even in case of a historical 
agreement  between  Serbia  and  Kosovo  involving  the 
recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by Belgrade, not all of 
the five resisting EU Member States are likely to automatically 
recognise Kosovo. For Cyprus, the Kosovo question is linked 
to its separatist Turkish minority31. Endorsing Kosovo would 
be – regardless of the circumstances – considered as a first 
step  towards  international  recognition  of  the  Republic  of 
Northern Cyprus32 33. Thus comes the vicious circle: without 
resolving the Cyprus question, there will be no recognition 
of Kosovo by all 27 Member States. Without recognition by 
all EU Member States, there is no membership perspective 
for Kosovo. Without a credible perspective for Kosovo, there 
is no credible membership perspective for Serbia. Without a 
perspective for Serbia, there is no credible perspective for the 
rest of the Western Balkans (except for Croatia and, eventually, 
Montenegro). Whereas the key to unlocking Bosnia’s process 
of  EU  integration  lies  within  the  country  itself,  the  key  to 
Kosovo’s integration process lies, in the long run, in Nicosia 
and in Ankara. 
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